The Room · 21:00–21:40 · Part One — The Fork, 1978–1984

A Race That Began Even

Two thermometers that are not alike, a sheet of incomes with two rows folded under, and a scoreboard fixed before the score is known.

8 min read · Priyanshu Sekhar Patra

An imagined night. Its year is left blank. Every number on the desk is the latest this book could verify: 21 October 2026.

You set the bottle aside. The Chief Statistician is the first office through the door tonight, and does not sit. On the desk goes a folder stamped 21 OCT 2026: two thinner folders, lettered A and B, and a blank sheet ruled into forty lines under one word, TRIAGE.

You reach for A, because A has the scores. The Statistician lays B on top of it. “You will be judged by numbers. Read the instruments before the readings.”

Folder BChief Statistician21 OCT 2026

Two thermometers

China. Chen, Chen, Hsieh and Song (2019) put real growth in 2010–16 about 1.8 points a year below the official rate.
China. The Rhodium Group (December 2023) put 2023 growth nearer 1.5 percent than the “around 5%” Beijing was about to report. Federal Reserve staff (June 2025) found that official growth since 2020 moves with a broader indicator and does not look overstated.
India. Arvind Subramanian (June 2019) put growth from 2011–12 to 2016–17 at about 4.5 percent a year (95 percent interval 3.5 to 5.5), against about 7 officially. The Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister rejected his estimate on 19 June 2019.
India. The IMF’s grade for the national accounts, November 2025: C, the second-lowest of four.
India. A new GDP series, base year 2022–23, released 27 February 2026. The reference date of the next Census, for most of the country: 00:00, 1 March 2027.

“These are two different arguments,” the Statistician says. “Don’t let anyone add them together.”

The Chinese argument is about incentives. Local governments collect the data from which China’s accounts are built, and they are rewarded for meeting growth targets; after 2008, the four authors argue, the statistics bureau’s corrections stopped being large enough. An admission came from inside the system: in January 2017 Liaoning’s governor told the provincial legislature that cities and counties had falsified fiscal revenue and other data from 2011 to 2014; reports of the speech put the overstatement of fiscal revenue at about a fifth.

The Indian argument is about method. India changed its data sources and formulas from 2011–12, and a former Chief Economic Adviser said the change inflated growth. The Prime Minister’s economic advisers replied that he had ignored services, farming and tax data and leaned on a private firm’s indicators. The IMF’s C named an outdated base year, 2011–12, and deflators built on wholesale prices, for want of a producer price index, with too much single deflation. February’s new series brought in double deflation for farming and manufacturing. On 15 October the IMF’s director for Asia and the Pacific welcomed the new methods. A former finance secretary, Subhash Chandra Garg, had questioned the 7.8 percent real growth reported for April to June 2026: the revision, he said, had lowered the previous year’s current-price GDP, and without it current-price growth would have been 2.6 percent, not the 10.3 percent reported. The Chief Economic Adviser called that cherry-picking; the new base year, he said, had revised last year’s quarters as well.

Where the chain breaksChain X29 · Skeptic verdict: weaken

What holds. Where officials are rewarded for a number, the number has bent; Liaoning’s admission is on the record. Even the Federal Reserve staff note found the official figures unusually smooth before 2020, through the financial crisis and the slowdown of 2014–15.

Where it breaks. The bend is neither fixed in size nor one-way. After an economic census, in December 2005, China’s statistics bureau raised its estimate of the 2004 level of GDP by 16.8 percent, because services had been under-reported. Rhodium’s 1.5 percent for 2023 and the Fed staff’s reading since 2020 point opposite ways, and this book does not average them. India’s rebasing lowered nominal GDP for 2025–26 by about 3 percent, yet two researchers at Ashoka University’s Isaac Centre for Public Policy note that the demand-side method is largely unchanged, and attribute much of the new manufacturing growth to the mechanical effect of double deflation. Withholding belongs to both. In August 2023 China stopped publishing its youth unemployment rate, last read at 21.3 percent for June, saying it had to study the age range and whether job-seeking students should count; it now publishes the rate with students left out. India never released its consumption survey for 2017–18, citing data quality; the next appeared in February 2024.

Safer wording used. China’s documented problem is falsification of local figures under incentive; how far it reaches national GDP is contested, and it may be smaller since 2020. India’s is a public dispute about method. Both governments have withheld a series and given a technical reason. The two thermometers are not equivalent, and each has been disputed in public.

Now A. The sheet goes down on the desk in front of you: one page, two columns, sixty-six rows. Income per head in current dollars, the World Bank’s series, India on the left, China on the right, 1960 at the top and 2025 at the bottom.

Folder AChief Statistician21 OCT 2026

One sheet: income per head

1960 · India $85 · China $90
2025 · India $2,702 · China $13,862
2025, at purchasing power · India about 11,700 · China about 29,300 international dollars
Years of growth above 10 percent, 1961–2024 · India none · China 22

The top row is almost a tie. The bottom row is five to one.

The third row shrinks the gap. Market dollars measure what a country can buy from the world: machines, fuel, chips. At home a haircut or a month’s rent costs a fraction of its American price, so a dollar’s worth of rupees buys what more than four dollars buy in America, and a dollar’s worth of yuan what a little over two buy. Counted that way, the ratio is two and a half to one. Purchasing power is also the softer number. In December 2007 the World Bank, using price surveys supplied by China for the first time, cut its purchasing-power estimate of China’s economy for 2005 by 40 percent.

You run a finger down the right-hand column looking for the year China stood where India stands now, and stop at 2007: $2,735. The Statistician turns the sheet over. On the back the same table is printed in constant 2015 dollars, prices held still, and on that clock India’s $2,523 is a level China passed in 2002. “Which China year you quote,” the Statistician says, “depends on which clock you read. Say which one, every time.” A third clock, the economic historians’ Maddison series, counts in 2011 international (purchasing-power) dollars and stops in 2022; India’s income that year is a level China passed in 2007.

Other Clock · which dollar?

India in 2025: $2,702 a head. Nearest China year: 2007 ($2,735).

The Other Clock

India's 2025 income is China's of 2007, or of 2002, depending on the dollar

Same two countries, same World Bank source, two ways of pricing a dollar. Current US$ converts each year's income at that year's prices and exchange rate; constant 2015 US$ holds prices and the exchange rate at their 2015 values. The book quotes both.

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (NY.GDP.PCAP.CD and NY.GDP.PCAP.KD), fetched Oct 2026

See the numbers

GDP per head, US$: India in 2025, the China year that matches it, and China's every year
	Current US$	Constant 2015 US$
India, 2025	$2,702	$2,523
China year nearest that income	2007	2002
China's income in that year	$2,735	$2,611
China, 1990	$319	$917
China, 1991	$334	$990
China, 1992	$368	$1,117
China, 1993	$379	$1,258
China, 1994	$476	$1,407
China, 1995	$613	$1,545
China, 1996	$713	$1,681
China, 1997	$787	$1,819
China, 1998	$835	$1,944
China, 1999	$881	$2,077
China, 2000	$969	$2,237
China, 2001	$1,065	$2,406
China, 2002	$1,164	$2,611
China, 2003	$1,307	$2,857
China, 2004	$1,531	$3,128
China, 2005	$1,778	$3,466
China, 2006	$2,129	$3,883
China, 2007	$2,735	$4,410
China, 2008	$3,523	$4,811
China, 2009	$3,898	$5,238
China, 2010	$4,629	$5,765
China, 2011	$5,704	$6,276
China, 2012	$6,405	$6,723
China, 2013	$7,147	$7,198
China, 2014	$7,781	$7,686
China, 2015	$8,175	$8,175
China, 2016	$8,255	$8,679
China, 2017	$8,980	$9,221
China, 2018	$10,086	$9,799
China, 2019	$10,343	$10,356
China, 2020	$10,627	$10,573
China, 2021	$12,887	$11,469
China, 2022	$12,971	$11,830
China, 2023	$12,951	$12,484
China, 2024	$13,293	$13,119
China, 2025	$13,862	$13,793

Down the right-hand margin someone has ticked every year China grew faster than 10 percent. The left margin has no ticks; India’s best year, 9.7 percent in 2021, came straight after a contraction of 5.8 percent. At 10 percent an economy doubles in about seven years; at 5 percent, in about fourteen. Over twenty-eight years the first grows fourteenfold and the second fourfold, and nothing dramatic has to happen in any single year.

Ten-percent years, 1961–2024

China grew faster than 10% in twenty-two separate years. India, in none.

Each square is a year: the darker, the faster the economy grew; solid squares are years above 10 percent; hatched squares are years it shrank. India's best year, 9.7 percent, came in 2021, a rebound from the pandemic.

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG), fetched Oct 2026

See the numbers

Real GDP growth, percent a year
Year	China	India
1961	−27.3%	3.7%
1962	−5.6%	2.9%
1963	10.3%	6.0%
1964	18.2%	7.5%
1965	17.0%	−2.6%
1966	10.7%	−0.1%
1967	−5.8%	7.8%
1968	−4.1%	3.4%
1969	16.9%	6.5%
1970	19.3%	5.2%
1971	7.1%	1.6%
1972	3.8%	−0.6%
1973	7.8%	3.3%
1974	2.3%	1.2%
1975	8.7%	9.2%
1976	−1.6%	1.7%
1977	7.6%	7.3%
1978	11.3%	5.7%
1979	7.6%	−5.2%
1980	7.8%	6.7%
1981	5.1%	6.0%
1982	9.0%	3.5%
1983	10.8%	7.3%
1984	15.2%	3.8%
1985	13.4%	5.3%
1986	8.9%	4.8%
1987	11.7%	4.0%
1988	11.2%	9.6%
1989	4.2%	6.0%
1990	3.9%	5.5%
1991	9.4%	1.1%
1992	14.3%	5.5%
1993	13.9%	4.8%
1994	13.1%	6.7%
1995	11.0%	7.6%
1996	10.0%	7.6%
1997	9.3%	4.1%
1998	7.9%	6.2%
1999	7.7%	8.9%
2000	8.6%	3.8%
2001	8.3%	4.8%
2002	9.2%	3.8%
2003	10.1%	7.9%
2004	10.1%	7.9%
2005	11.5%	7.9%
2006	12.7%	8.1%
2007	14.2%	7.7%
2008	9.7%	3.1%
2009	9.4%	7.9%
2010	10.6%	8.5%
2011	9.5%	5.2%
2012	7.9%	5.5%
2013	7.8%	6.4%
2014	7.5%	7.4%
2015	7.0%	8.0%
2016	6.8%	8.3%
2017	6.9%	6.8%
2018	6.8%	6.5%
2019	6.1%	3.9%
2020	2.3%	−5.8%
2021	8.6%	9.7%
2022	3.1%	7.6%
2023	5.4%	7.2%
2024	5.0%	7.1%

Beneath the table someone has ruled a single line forward from 2025, faint, in pencil. India’s best ten years so far, 2008 to 2018, grew income per head by 5.7 percent a year. Ten more such years would take $2,523 to about $4,390 by 2035, roughly where Korea stood in 1981–82. Doubling in ten years needs 7.2 percent a year; Korea averaged 7.6 percent from 1987 to 1997, a pace that would lift $2,523 to about $5,250. The line is labelled, in capitals: ARITHMETIC, NOT FORECAST.

ARITHMETIC, NOT FORECAST

Try your own rateDrag to draw a third line

The Corridor Ruler

Ten more years take India's income from $2,523 to about $4,390 at 5.7% a year, or about $5,250 at 7.6% a year

Each dashed line carries India's 2025 income forward ten years at a fixed rate; the shaded corridor lies between the slowest and the fastest. 5.7% a year is India's best decade so far (2008–18). 7.6% is the pace Korea held in 1987–97. Korea's income per head in 1982 was $4,676. This is arithmetic, not a forecast: it shows what a pace would deliver, not that it will be held.

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (NY.GDP.PCAP.KD), fetched Oct 2026; the dashed lines are this book's arithmetic

See the numbers

India's GDP per head, constant 2015 US$: the record to 2025, then 2026–2035 at fixed growth rates (arithmetic, not forecast)
Year	India, actual	At 5.7% a year	At 7.6% a year
2000	$757	—	—
2001	$779	—	—
2002	$794	—	—
2003	$841	—	—
2004	$893	—	—
2005	$948	—	—
2006	$1,008	—	—
2007	$1,069	—	—
2008	$1,087	—	—
2009	$1,155	—	—
2010	$1,235	—	—
2011	$1,282	—	—
2012	$1,333	—	—
2013	$1,399	—	—
2014	$1,484	—	—
2015	$1,584	—	—
2016	$1,694	—	—
2017	$1,789	—	—
2018	$1,883	—	—
2019	$1,936	—	—
2020	$1,807	—	—
2021	$1,965	—	—
2022	$2,098	—	—
2023	$2,230	—	—
2024	$2,367	—	—
2025	$2,523	$2,523	$2,523
2026	—	$2,667	$2,715
2027	—	$2,819	$2,921
2028	—	$2,979	$3,143
2029	—	$3,149	$3,382
2030	—	$3,329	$3,639
2031	—	$3,519	$3,916
2032	—	$3,719	$4,213
2033	—	$3,931	$4,533
2034	—	$4,155	$4,878
2035	—	$4,392	$5,249
Korea, 1982 (reference)	$4,676	—	—

Citations sit at the foot of the sheet in small type. The World Bank counts 34 middle-income economies that have reached high income since the 1990s, and 108 still in the middle at the end of 2023. Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo and Robinson estimate that democratisation raises income per head by about 20 percent in the long run. A meta-analysis of 483 estimates finds no direct effect on growth, but positive indirect ones, through human capital and lower inflation among others. Ashutosh Varshney notes that South Korea and Taiwan adopted universal-franchise democracy only in the late 1980s and the mid-1990s, two decades after their economies began to rise. Korea passed India’s present income in 1973, and approved a constitution with direct presidential elections in 1987, at three times that income. India has to build the state and keep the vote at the same time.

Halfway up the sheet two rows are folded under, the crease pressed flat so that the table reads straight from 1989 to 1992. You put a thumbnail under the fold.

“Not yet,” says the Statistician. “You’ll want that one later.”

Door D1 · closedWhat happened in the two years folded under?

The choice comes before the answers do. You can fix the scoreboard tonight: name the numbers by which this decade will be judged, publish how each is measured, and promise not to change either mid-term. Or you can wait until you know which numbers will flatter you. The first can embarrass you before the next election. The second will be believed by no one after it.

Fixing it tonight hands your opponents the ruler. They will measure you with your own method, in public, and you will have no grounds to object.

You fix it tonight. The scoreboard’s first line is the figure on the back of the sheet, income per head in constant dollars: $2,523 in 2025. The other scoreboard lines will come with the other folders. On the Triage Sheet, line one goes in: R1, the Scoreboard Rule. Thirty-nine lines remain.

In the margin, not on a line, the Statistician pencils a second rule and leaves it unticked: R12, the Thermometer Rule. A statistics office protected by law, no series ever suspended, the raw data published. “That one you’ll want to break,” the Statistician says, “the first time a number goes against you.”

Triage sheet: 1 of 40 lines filled

The Statistician takes folder B and leaves you the sheet. Every row on it counts money. None counts who could read, or how many children lived to five. Ten hours and twenty minutes to the microphone.

Sources

Wei Chen, Xilu Chen, Chang-Tai Hsieh and Zheng Song, 'A Forensic Examination of China's National Accounts', NBER Working Paper 25754 (2019; Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2019)academic work · foreignChina's national accounts are built on data collected by local governments, which are rewarded for meeting targets; the statistics bureau's adjustments were insufficient after 2008; GDP growth in 2010-16 was 1.8 percentage points lower than official (the Brookings version gives 1.7 points for 2008-16).
Daniel H. Rosen, Logan Wright, Charlie Vest and Rogan Quinn, 'Through the Looking Glass: China's 2023 GDP and the Year Ahead', Rhodium Group, 29 Dec 2023press report · foreign2023 growth was probably closer to 1.5% than the 'around 5%' Beijing would report.
William L. Barcelona, Danilo Cascaldi-Garcia, Jasper J. Hoek and Eva Van Leemput, 'Is China Really Growing at 5 Percent?', FEDS Notes, Federal Reserve Board, 6 Jun 2025official document · foreignAn alternative indicator has tracked official GDP growth closely since 2020Q1; official figures have not recently been overstating growth; before the pandemic official data were unusually smooth while the indicator swung more (Global Financial Crisis, 2014-15 slowdown).
Arvind Subramanian, 'India's GDP Mis-estimation: Likelihood, Magnitudes, Mechanisms, and Implications', Harvard Kennedy School CID Faculty Working Paper 354, June 2019academic work · foreignIndia changed its data sources and method for real GDP from 2011-12; official average growth 2011-12 to 2016-17 about 7%; his estimate about 4.5% (95% interval 3.5-5.5). The author is a former Chief Economic Adviser (origin recorded by institution).
The Week, 'EAC-PM rejects Subramanian's claim on over-estimation of GDP', 19 Jun 2019press report · domesticThe Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister rejected the estimate on 19 June 2019: the analysis ignored services and agriculture, relied mostly on indicators from CMIE, a private agency, and overlooked tax data.
IMF, 'India: 2025 Article IV Consultation — Press Release; Staff Report; Staff Statement; and Statement by the Executive Director for India', IMF Country Report No. 25/314, November 2025official document · foreignInformational Annex, data adequacy assessment (staff report completed 6 Nov 2025; Board 21 Nov 2025): national accounts rated C on the four-tier A-D scale (C = 'some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance'; D the lowest). Rationale: (i) an outdated base year (2011/12), (ii) wholesale price indices used as deflators 'due to the lack of producer prices indices', and 'excessive use of single deflation, which may introduce cyclical biases', (iii) production-expenditure discrepancies, (iv) no seasonally adjusted data. PDF read as text: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1indea2025003-source-pdf.pdf
MoSPI, National Statistics Office, 'Press Note on New Series of GDP Estimates with Base Year 2022-23', 27 Feb 2026 (via PIB)official document · domesticReleased 27 February 2026; base year 2022-23 replaces 2011-12; double deflation adopted in agriculture and manufacturing.
Gazette of India, Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 2681(E), 16 Jun 2025: Census 2027official document · domesticReference date 00:00 hours, 1 March 2027, except Ladakh and snow-bound non-synchronous areas of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. (Same id and entry as ch 1, where the PDF was read; hence 'for most of India'.)
Caixin Global, 'Liaoning Government Admits False Growth Data from 2011-14', 18 Jan 2017press report · domesticGovernor Chen Qiufa disclosed in a work report to the provincial legislature on Tuesday 17 January 2017 (per People's Daily) that city and county officials made false claims about fiscal revenues and other data from 2011 to 2014; Caixin states that fiscal revenues over the period were exaggerated by around 20% overall, some county figures more than double actual income.
China Digital Times (Sophie Beach), 'Liaoning Governor Confirms Reports Falsified Data', 19 Jan 2017press report · foreignGovernor Chen Qiufa's annual work report of 17 January 2017 said figures for 2011-14 were inflated; citing People's Daily, fiscal revenues were inflated by at least 20% over the period (peak-year local inflation of up to 23% per SCMP); the governor himself gave no percentage.
ThePrint (PTI), 'IMF backs India's updated GDP methodology, calls revision welcome development', 15 Oct 2026press report · domesticOn 15 October 2026 Krishna Srinivasan, director of the IMF's Asia and Pacific Department, called the GDP revision a 'welcome development' consistent with the Fund's advice. Former finance secretary S. C. Garg had contested the 7.8% June-quarter growth figure as 'artificially boosted by compressing the previous year's figures'; Chief Economic Adviser V. Anantha Nageswaran called his approach 'cherry-picking' and said the change of methodology and base year led to revisions to last year's quarterly data.
Outlook Business, 'How ex-Fin Secy Subhash Garg's claims triggered great GDP debate', 2 Sep 2026 (updated 4 Sep 2026)press report · domesticQ1 FY27 (April-June 2026): real GDP (constant prices) grew 7.8% (Rs 81.36 against Rs 75.46 lakh crore); nominal GDP (current prices) Rs 88.27 lakh crore against Rs 80.00 lakh crore a year earlier, growth of 10.3% as reported. Garg: last year's quarter revised down to 6.9% real growth and to Rs 80 trillion in current prices (from Rs 86 trillion, his figure); 'If you had not revised last year's GDP, the growth in current prices would have been only 2.6%.' Critics, including a former CEA, said he was comparing incompatible numbers.
IndustryWeek, 'China Revises 2004 GDP Up 16.8%', 21 Dec 2005press report · foreignOn 20 December 2005 NBS commissioner Li Deshui announced that, after a new economic census, China's 2004 GDP was raised by 2,300 billion yuan (16.8%) to 15,987.8 billion yuan ($1.98 trillion); services output had been under-reported.
Pradnyan Dani and Siddharth Shrimal, 'India National Accounts Revision: A Comparative Analysis of the Old and New GDP Series', Isaac Centre for Public Policy, Ashoka University, June 2026academic work · domesticThe new series lowered FY26 nominal GDP by about 3.08% (Rs 357 to 345 lakh crore); demand-side estimation is still largely unchanged; statistical discrepancies, while narrower, continue to grow; much of the manufacturing uplift is a mechanical effect of double deflation.
Lianhe Zaobao, report on China suspending publication of youth unemployment data, 15 Aug 2023 (in Chinese)press report · foreignNBS spokesman Fu Linghui announced the suspension of age-group urban unemployment rates, citing the need to improve the statistics and the open question of whether job-seeking students should be counted; the last published rate was 21.3% for June 2023 (claim and URL from the corpus, chronicle-2022-2026.json; the host was blocked in this session).
NBC News, 'China suspends data on youth unemployment', 15 Aug 2023press report · foreignOn Tuesday 15 August 2023 China said it would temporarily stop publishing the youth unemployment rate, last 21.3% in June for urban residents aged 16-24; spokesman Fu Linghui said more research was needed on which age bracket to use and whether students seeking jobs before graduation should count as unemployed.
Caixin Global, 'China's youth jobless rate climbs to 17.9% in July', 20 Aug 2026press report · domesticThe statistics bureau now publishes the unemployment rate for people aged 16 to 24 excluding students.
Business Today, 'Govt withholds consumer spending report for 2017-18 on grounds of data quality', 15 Nov 2019press report · domesticMoSPI 'decided not to release the Consumer Expenditure Survey results of 2017-2018', citing 'data quality issues' (15 November 2019).
The Hindu, 'After a 11-year gap, Centre discloses key consumption expenditure survey data', 24 Feb 2024press report · domesticThe 2017-18 survey's findings were never released after the government cited 'data quality' issues; the government released the broad findings of the 2022-23 survey on 24 February 2024. Read in this session via the Wayback Machine copy, https://web.archive.org/web/20250108093323/https://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/after-11-years-household-consumption-expenditure-survey-findings-released/article67882939.ece
GDP per capita, current US$ (World Bank, World Development Indicators, NY.GDP.PCAP.CD)dataset · foreignGDP per head, current US$ (NY.GDP.PCAP.CD): 1960 India 84.93, China 89.72; 1978 China 156.66, India 209.39 (yuan rate administered in 1978, so the gap is measure-dependent); 1990 India 371.09, China 318.50; 1991 India 305.57, China 334.13; China 2006 2,129.26, 2007 2,734.73; 2025 India 2,702.48, China 13,861.97 (5.1 to 1). GDP per head, PPP current international $ (NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD): 1990 India 1,177, China 991; 1991 1,203 / 1,105; 1992 1,271 / 1,276; 2025 India 11,747.92, China 29,333.33 (2.50 to 1); PPP over market rate 4.35 (India), 2.12 (China). GDP per head, constant 2015 US$ (NY.GDP.PCAP.KD): India 2025 2,523.44; China 2001 2,405.99, 2002 2,610.66. GDP growth (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG): China above 10% in 22 years, 1961-2024; India none, best 9.69% in 2021 after -5.78% in 2020; India -5.24% in fiscal 1979-80 (labelled 1979); 1991 India about 1%, China above 9%. Conversion factors (PA.NUS.ATLS), 1990 to 1991: rupee 17.95 to 24.52 (+36.6%), yuan 5.23 to 5.74 (+9.8%); India's WDI years are fiscal (Apr-Mar). Life expectancy (SP.DYN.LE00.IN): 1978 China 63.10, India 52.42; 1960 33.42 vs 45.61; 1962 50.96 vs 46.13 (crossing); China 1984 66.15. Under-five mortality per 1,000 (SH.DYN.MORT): 1978 69.8 vs 180.7; 2021 7.0 vs 31.2. Fertility (SP.DYN.TFRT.IN): 1978 China 2.716, India 4.888; 2024 China 1.01, India 1.96. Adult literacy (SE.ADT.LITR.ZS, SE.ADT.LITR.FE.ZS): China 65.51% (1982), India 40.76% (1981); female 51.14% vs 25.68% (Dreze-Sen's 56% for China is 1985 and another source; the chapter dates each). FDI net inflows, current US$ (BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD): China 1979 $0.08m, 1980 $57m, 1981 $265m, 1982 $430m, 1983 $636m, 1984 $1,258m (about $2.65bn over 1980-84); 1991 $4,366m, 1992 $11,156m, 1993 $27,515m. India 1979 $48.57m, 1980 $79.16m, 1981 $91.92m, 1982 $72.1m, 1983 $5.6m, 1984 $19.2m (about $0.27bn over 1980-84). Merchandise exports, current US$ (TX.VAL.MRCH.CD.WT): China $9.955bn (1978), $26.139bn (1984). Sex ratio at birth (SP.POP.BRTH.MF): China 1.071 (1980), 1.178 (2004-05); South Korea 1.157 (1990); India peak 1.096 (2010). API pattern: https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/CHN;IND/indicator/<CODE>?format=json. Folded into this id at the cross-chapter merge: wb-fdi (ch 0), wdi-growth, wdi-tfr, wdi-srb (ch 3), wb-wdi-fdi, wb-wdi-exports (ch 4).
Congressional Research Service, 'How Large is China's Economy? Does it Matter?' (RS22808, 13 Feb 2008)official document · foreignWorld Bank revision of December 2007, the first to include recent price-survey data provided by China, cut China's 2005 PPP GDP by 40% ($8.8 trillion to $5.3 trillion).
GDP per capita, constant 2015 US$ (World Bank, World Development Indicators, NY.GDP.PCAP.KD)dataset · foreignIndia 2025 $2,523, a level China passed in 2002; India's best ten-year per-head growth 5.65% a year (2008-18; next best 5.33%, 2006-16); 2,523 x 1.057^10 = about $4,390-4,400 in 2035, roughly Korea's level in 1981-82 (1981 $4,378; 1982 $4,676); doubling in ten years needs 7.18% a year (2^(1/10)-1); Korea's pace 1987-97 was 7.60% a year, which applied to $2,523 gives about $5,250 (1.076^10 = 2.08); Korea first above $2,523 in 1973 ($2,583); Korea 1987 $7,535, about 3.0 times India's 2025 level.
GDP per capita, Maddison Project Database (Our World in Data)dataset · foreignSeries ends in 2022. India 2022 $7,766; China 2006 $7,271, 2007 $7,896, so India's 2022 level is one China passed in 2007 (ch 1; CSV fetched 22 Oct 2026). China ahead of India by about 43% in 1990 (ch 10, as stated in live ch 01).
World Bank, World Development Report 2024: The Middle-Income Trapofficial document · foreignSince the 1990s only 34 middle-income economies have become high-income; 108 were still middle-income at the end of 2023.
Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo and James A. Robinson, 'Democracy Does Cause Growth', NBER Working Paper 20004 (2014); Journal of Political Economy 2019academic work · foreignDemocratisations increase GDP per capita by about 20% in the long run.
Hristos Doucouliagos and Mehmet Ali Ulubaşoğlu, 'Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis', American Journal of Political Science 52(1), 2008, 61-83academic work · foreignMeta-regression of 483 estimates from 84 studies: democracy has no direct effect on growth but robust positive indirect effects through higher human capital, lower inflation, lower political instability and higher economic freedom; net effect not detrimental (abstract).
India's Democratic Challenge (Ashutosh Varshney, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007)press report · foreignSouth Korea and Taiwan embraced universal-franchise democracy only in the late 1980s and the mid-1990s, two decades after their economic upturn began (ch 1); elite-track vs mass-track reforms; 1996 survey: only 19% had heard of the reforms (ch 10). Typed press: a Foreign Affairs magazine essay by an academic (ch 10's registry had 'academic'; reconciled to press). Wayback copy: https://web.archive.org/web/20240426113940/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2007-03-01/indias-democratic-challenge
Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, South Korea: A Country Study (LC call number DS902 .S68 1992), ch. 4 'Government and Politics' (William Shaw): 'The Constitutional Framework' (archived loc.gov copy)official document · foreignThe 1987 constitutional bill was passed by the National Assembly on 12 October 1987 and approved by 93 percent of the voters in a national referendum on 28 October; it provided for direct election of the president. Read in this session from the archived loc.gov copy (the current loc.gov item page returned HTTP 403; the countrystudies.us mirror carries the same text).